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A bilateral oligopoly model is used to measure the effect of increased 
concentration on industry market power and cost efficiency.  Consistent with previous 
studies, we find that cost efficiency gains dominate potential market power effects from 
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Background 
  As agricultural food processing and retailing industries become increasingly 
concentrated, there have been numerous studies examining the impact of changes in 
market structure on social welfare (Azzam; Kinnucan).  An issue of increasing concern is 
whether industry efficiency gains dominate market power effects resulting from an 
increase in industry concentration. 
  Most industrial organization literature suggests that mergers’ efficiency gain 
offsets consumers’ potential welfare loss (Azzam; Azzam and Schroeter; Sexton).  More 
recently, however, Lopez et al. found that market power effects dominates cost efficiency 
effects in most industries, and that further increase in concentration would “increase 
output price in nearly every case.”   
  Previous studies have some limitations.  First, the wholesale market is assumed to 
possess oligopsony power in some studies (Azzam and Schroeter; Azzam), and oligopoly 
in other studies (Lopez et al.).  Yet, the US beef industry is very concentrated by most 
economic standards (Ward).  Allowing for market power in procuring farm inputs 
(selling final output) while ignoring potential market power in selling final output 
(procuring farm inputs) is likely to understate market power effects.   Second, market 
conduct parameters estimated using New Empirical Industrial Organization models seem 
sensitive to demand specification.  Hennessey argues that, at least theoretically, there are 
demand schedules, with well-behaved properties, such that welfare-reducing merges 
might appear privately and socially attractive even if there are no efficiency gains.  These 
restrictive assumptions may have dictated previous results.   3 
  This study follows Azzam, and Lopez at al. by also separating market power 
effects from cost efficiency resulting from an increase in industry concentration.  
However, unlike these authors, we allow for oligopsony power in the cattle procurement 
market and oligopoly power in the beef retail market.  Second, we use several alternative 
specifications for retail output demand to provide a sensitivity analysis on parameter 
estimates.  Industry tradeoffs caused by increased concentration in the beef processing 
industry are estimated assuming profit-maximizing behavior of three major players, 
retailer, processor, and raw material producer. 
  The objective of this study is twofold.  First, the effects of increase of 
concentration on industry costs and market power are separated out in a bilateral 
oligopoly framework.  Second, alternative demand specifications are used to provide a 
sensitivity test on parameter estimates. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as following.  The next section introduces 
a bilateral oligopoly model.  Empirical procedures for the case of the U.S. beef industry 
are presented in section 2.  Section 3 reports the results, and section 4 presents 
concluding remarks. 
 
I. The Model 
Consider an industry where processors compete imperfectly in procuring farm 
inputs from a competitive farm sector.  Processors sell their output to retailers competing 
imperfectly in selling final product to consumers.   Both processing and retailing sectors 
are assumed to be concentrated, and the interaction between processors and retailers is a 
characterized by a non-domination imperfect competition.  In this bilateral oligopoly   4 
setting (Blair et al., Machlup and Taber), total industry output is similar to the output that 
would result from joint profit maximization between processors and retailers (Schneider).  
In view of the intended application, this industry is modeled as a single “processing 
industry” which competes imperfectly in procuring farm input and in selling final output 
consumers.   
Assume there are n processors converting farm inputs into processed output using 
fixed proportions technology.  The production technology also uses non-farm inputs, 
which are purchased in competitive markets.   
Considering n identical processors producing homogeneous output, i.e., Y = Y
 p =  
Y
 f = ny, a representative processors’ profit maximization problem is  
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where P
 p is the output price, P
 f is the farm input price, C(.) is the processor’s cost 
function.  The first order condition for profit maximizing is 
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Rearranging the first order condition and re-writing it in elasticity form yields 
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j i dy y d / θ  is the ith firm’s conjecture about its rival response to a change in its   5 
purchase of farm input.  Because of the assumption of fixed proportion technology in 
converting farm inputs into processed product,  i φ = . i θ  
Following Azzam, and Lopez et al., the ith firm’s cost function is assumed to take 
the generalized Leontief form: 
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where ij α , i λ , and βi are parameters.  Replacing c(y
 p,v) in expression (2) by ∂C(y
 p,v)/∂y
 p 
obtained by differencing expression (3), and multiplying (2) by each firm’s market share 
(yi/Y),  and summing across n firms in the industry, and factoring out P
 p and P
 f yields: 
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i Y y H is the Herfindahl index.   
If processors are assumed to compete perfectly in selling farm input (i.e. Φ =-1), 
then equation (4) is similar to Azzam’s equation (5).  If processors are assumed to 
compete perfectly in procuring farm input (i.e. Θ = -1), then equation (4) is similar to 
Lopez et al. equation (5).  Notice that if firms compete Cournot in selling final product 
and/or in procuring farm input then Φ = 0 and/or Θ = 0, respectively.   
Using Shephard’s lemma, industry non-farm input demand equations are  
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As in Azzam, and Lopez et al., market power and cost efficiency effects from 
increasing industry concentration are given by   
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where the first right hand side is the oligopoly power effect on output price, and the 
second term is the scale efficiency effect. 
 
II.  Empirical procedures 
The empirical application uses annual data for the wholesale beef industry, 
ranging from 1970 to 1996.  The data were compiled from several sources.  Input 
quantities and prices are from the National Bureau of Economic Research database 
(NBER) of Bartelsman et al. on U.S. Manufacturing data.  The NBER data are 4-digit 
SIC.  The prices of capital and materials are represented by the NBER’s price deflator for 
capital and materials respectively.  Wage per worker-hour are computed by dividing 
NBER’s total payroll by the total number of production workers in the industry.  The 
total supply of commercial beef and retail price of beef, the inventory of beef cows, and 
the net –farm value of cattle were compiled by the Economic Research Service, United 
States Department of Agriculture.  Productivity of capital services and materials are 2-
digit SIC data for the Food and Kindred Products from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS).  Consumer price index and price index for farm output data are also from the 
BLS.  Data on 4-firm concentration ration were compiled from several GIPSA annual 
reports.    7 
Empirical application necessitates specification of farm-input supply and retail 
output demand schedules.  Farm input supply and retail output demand are represented by 
respectively, 
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where 
f p 3 −  is a lag-three real farm value of cattle , pc is the real price of calves,  pd is the 
real price of diesel, p is the real price of beef, pp is the real price of pork, I is the 
disposable income and t is a time trend variable.  The base year for all price variables is 
1987. 
A system of equations 4, 5, 7 and 8 was estimated jointly by nonlinear three-stage 
least squares (N3SLS).  Specifically, the estimating model consists of six equations: the 
pricing equation, the retail demand equation, the cattle supply equation and input demand 
equations for labor, capital and packing materials.   
 
III. Empirical Results 
The results are reported in table 1.   Positive values of αij (when i = j and when i ≠ 
j) suggest that packers cost function is concave and well behaved
1. Own price elasticities 
for output demand and farm supply of cattle elasticities have the expected size and signs 
and are significant at the one and six percent levels of statistical significance
2,  
 
                                                 
1 Homogeneity and symmetry are guaranteed by construction. 
2 The elasticity of supply is calculated using a three-period lagged farm cattle price.   8 
Table 1. N3SLQ Parameter Estimates  
Parameter Estimate Std. Error    Parameter  Estimate Std. Error 
Φ  -1.256  0.134    βL  -0.001  0.003 
r
d ε   -0.318  0.030    βK  -0.030  0.006 
f
s ε   0.141  0.080    βM  0.053  0.013 
αLL  0.045  0.032    δ0  4.479  0.201 
αKK  0.597  0.221    δ1  0.0002  0.003 
αMM  1.227  0.292    δ2  0.013  0.031 
αLK  0.341  0.108    δ3  -0.00004  0.00001 
αLM  0.151  0.129    s0  3.470  0.199 
αMK  -0.611  0.192    s1  -0.004  0.005 
λL  -0.012  0.003    s2  -0.182  0.035 
λK  0.034  0.011    s3  -0.098  0.043 
λM  -0.033  0.014         
 
 
respectively.  The sign of the income elasticity coefficient, δ3, is anomalous.  It suggests 
that beef is an inferior good.   
  The estimate of the conjectural elasticity, Ф, is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level of significance.  Thus, the assumption of packers price taking 
behavior (Ф = -1) when procuring cattle and when selling processed beef is rejected.   
This result is consistent with previous studies that found that packers compete 
imperfectly when procuring farm inputs and when selling processed output. 
The estimate of cost-elasticity, given by MC/AC suggests that the beef packing 
industry has significant economies of size.  Thus, consistent with previous results, we 
find that consolidation in the beef packing industry could be efficiency driven.  Notice,   9 
however, that the size of the cost elasticity estimate (0.75) is relatively smaller than the 
values of 0.95 reported by Lopez et al.  
The basic hypothesis of this study is that an increase in market concentration 
generates losses in both cattle procurement markets and beef retail markets.  Oligopoly 
and oligopsony power effects due to increase in concentration are statistically significant 
at the five percent level.  Notice that the estimate of market power affects in the cattle 
procurement market, 1.8, is a double (in absolute value) of the estimate for market power 
effects in the output market, 0.9.  Thus, farmers seem to suffer bigger loss when 
concentration in the beef processing industry increases.  Notice also, that the estimate of 
the “total” market power effect, 2.7, is greater than the estimate of 0.2 and 2.4 reported 
by Azzam, and by Lopez et al., respectively.  Azzam assumed perfect competition in the 
output markets, and Lopez et al. assumed that packers compete perfectly when procuring 
cattle inputs.  Hence, estimates of market power in previous studies seem underestimated.   
  The estimate of cost efficiency gain from increased concentration is -3.76.  The 
net price effect is -1.09. Thus, our bilateral monopoly model suggests that increase 
consolidation in the beef packing industry results in significant decrease in beef prices at 
the retail level.   
 
Concluding Remarks 
Most industrial organization literature suggests that mergers’ efficiency gain 
offsets consumers’ potential welfare loss.  More recently, however, Lopez et al. found 
that market power effects dominate cost efficiency effects in most industries.     10 
This study extended the work of Azzam, and Lopez et al. by measuring the effect 
of increased concentration on industry market power and cost efficiency, using a bilateral 
oligopoly model.   The main finding is that cost efficiency gains dominate market power 
effects from increase in industry concentration.  This result is consistent with previous 
finding that consolidation in the U.S. beef industry is efficiency driven.  
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